

CONFIDENTIALSUMMARY RECORD OF TENTH MEETING OF
QUADRIPARTITE WORKING GROUP ON GERMANY AND BERLINMARCH 22, 1960Participants:FranceMr. Winckler
Mr. ManetUnited KingdomLord Hood
Mr. LoganGermany

Mr. Pauls

United StatesMr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Vigdeman
Mr. Kearney
Mr. McKiernan
Mr. Dean

Defense - Col. Schofield

Mr. Hillenbrand opened the meeting by noting that we were going to release to the press the text of the 1944 agreement establishing a separate administration for Berlin in addition to the three zones of occupation in Germany as a refutation of Soviet claims that Berlin formed a part of the territory of East Germany. Although unclassified, this documentation was hard to come by and it might have a favorable public effect.

Mr. Hillenbrand then reviewed the NATO discussion of the last report of the Working Group, noting the NATO conclusion that the Western position on the all-German and Berlin questions would probably be the same at the opening of the summit as that contained in the Western Peace Plan, and NATO consensus that it was unlikely that a final report of the Working Group would be available for discussion prior to the NATO ministerial meeting in Istanbul. Secretary General Spaak had also asked for the views of NATO members on Germany and Berlin and had pointed out that there would be no grounds for complaint on the position taken by the Working Group if such NATO comment was not forthcoming. Mr. Hillenbrand noted that some quadripartite work would still remain to be done between the Foreign Ministers meeting in April and the meeting in Istanbul, and whatever report emerged from this would presumably be the main feature of NATO consultation on the German question. The NATO discussion had reflected NATO recognition of the interim nature of the Foreign Ministers meeting and the fact that it was expected to give guidance for further preparations on the Western position on Berlin and Germany rather than taking final positions. All in all, the discussion had shown that the

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question of the relationship between NATO and the Working Group and the operations of the Working Group would pose no serious problems.

Mr. Hillenbrand mentioned that the subgroup established in the last meeting of the Quadripartite Working Group had not yet completed its work on the paper requested by the French representative but had drafted the paper in such a way that it could form part of the eventual Working Group report. He asked Mr. Winckler whether the French Government still wished that this paper be available for informal transmission to governments prior to the intensive phase of Working Group preparations on April 4. Mr. Winckler said the French did not insist on this but merely wanted the paper to be ready for the beginning of the Working Group deliberations. Mr. Hillenbrand said he saw no harm in transmitting the paper to capitals with the explicit designation that it was a product of the subgroup and had not yet been discussed in the Working Group.

Lord Hood said he felt the paper should be shortened if it was to be read by the Foreign Ministers. He said there was confusion in the paper between the possible advantages of seeking some agreement on Berlin and the advantages or disadvantages of specific agreements themselves. He said that in theory he could visualize a new status of Berlin in which it would neither be a part of the Federal Republic nor come under the UN but would in effect be a free city with Western forces remaining in it. This would get away from the occupation rights question. Something similar had been done in Trieste, though it must be stated that such an outcome might be as difficult to achieve as negotiation of a new basis of occupation. Perhaps it was merely a question of nomenclature. Mr. Pauls said he felt the draft paper should be part of the Working Group report but that it should be shorter in order to be read. He asked whether this wouldn't be possible by excluding theoretical possibilities which were scarcely likely to take place, focusing on the more limited range of practical possibilities.

Mr. Winckler said he felt the work of drafting the paper had been most useful but that up to now the Working Group had been fighting shadows in terms of fending off new proposals which had not really been defined. It had been found by the subgroup that if the advantages and disadvantages of a new status on Berlin were to be defined at all, it was absolutely necessary to specify what new status was being evaluated. The Working Group as a whole must at some point face up to the question of what it wants and what it does not want. Mr. Hillenbrand said that perhaps a brief covering report giving the substance of the paper could be given in the Working Group's report and the full report included as an annex so as to obviate the possibility that experts might have to go over the same ground in the next phase of preparations. He then suggested that the Working Group might start work on a draft of the all-German section of its report to the Foreign Ministers and suggested that the U.K. might wish to submit a paper on the thoughts expressed at the last meeting regarding the relationship between the Western

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Peace Plan and a possible plebiscite proposal.

Lord Hood noted that the suggestions had been made from the point of view of easier public understanding of a unified Western proposal rather than two separate proposals. Mr. Pauls noted that the German side felt the Peace Plan and the plebiscite proposal should in fact be separated in order to achieve the greatest public effect. The Peace Plan contained nothing new. The plebiscite plan was a relatively new element which could pose special difficulty for the Soviets. It would make it easier for the Soviets to reject a Western plebiscite proposal if it were presented as part of a Peace Plan which the Soviets had already rejected in any case. Furthermore, the Peace Plan was extremely complicated and the plebiscite proposal would further complicate it if added to it or it might be lost in it. The Germans believed that a plebiscite proposal should be presented separately and following renewed presentation of the Peace Plan. In this case, it would be the last Western proposal tabled and might therefore be easier to keep under public discussion for awhile. Regarding Lord Hood's remarks at a previous meeting on removing references to disarmament from the Peace Plan, Mr. Pauls did not believe that all references to disarmament should be entirely eliminated from the Peace Plan because this would break up the Geneva package presentation and because a continued close connection of disarmament and political problems was desirable. Mr. Pauls suggested that a subgroup start work on reviewing the discussion of disarmament in the Peace Plan. Mr. Hillenbrand asked whether it would not be better to wait awhile in order to see the results of disarmament negotiations before undertaking this task. Mr. Pauls agreed and said this portion of the work could be done immediately prior to the summit.

Mr. Winckler said he would like to comment on the U.S. paper on the basis of a modus vivendi in Berlin (II WG/1.4). He said the paper should be examined in the light of the discussion in the subgroup of the pros and cons of changes in the status in Berlin. The main impression he had derived from the work on the draft report of the subgroup was that the minimum requirements defined in the American paper would not be met in a change in status of the Western powers in Berlin. If an agreement on Berlin were based only on minor adjustments of the status quo then it might be possible to meet the requirements. He felt that two further requirements should be added -- a principle of reciprocity that anything done in East Berlin should also apply to West Berlin; and secondly, a statement of minimum requirements should contain a provision that the Western powers did not wish to change their policy on non-recognition of the East Zone regime, hence no change in status would be acceptable which had the effect of improving the position of the East German regime. For example, if one imagined a new status for the city it would be difficult to assume that the Soviets would remain in charge. The GDR would then assume their powers. Lord Hood said that he disagreed with the task taken by Mr. Winckler. The minimum Western requirement on Berlin was political freedom and the American paper then proceeded to say

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how effect could be given this requirement. It stated the minimum requirements and then suggested how they might be applied.

Mr. Hillenbrand questioned whether reciprocity of treatment of East and West Berlin could realistically be applied to all aspects of the Berlin question, since such reciprocity obviously did not exist today in many areas of activity. Mr. Winckler said his intention was that the principle of reciprocity should refer to all changes or innovations in the status quo. Mr. Winckler said that though the American paper referred to principles underlying the Western position in Berlin, these principles did not emerge clearly from the paper and it would be useful to have them spelled out in a separate document. Mr. Hillenbrand asked if some of Mr. Winckler's points had not been taken care of in the subgroup draft paper. Mr. Winckler said that as he viewed the subgroup paper, the minimum requirements described by the U.S. would be fully met only by possible limited accommodations on the basis of the present status of Berlin, but not by a change in that status. Mr. Pauls agreed with the three points mentioned by Mr. Winckler where reciprocity in East Berlin would be desirable -- propaganda, level of forces, and prohibition of stationing of nuclear weapons in Berlin. He also agreed with Mr. Winckler that there must be reciprocity of any other new elements, that there must be no increased recognition of the East Zone regime, and that the minimum requirements could not be met by a change of status of the city. In addition, the German side would like to ask that the paper include a further requirement that only the presence of the troops of the three powers can provide the necessary security for Berlin. He also suggested that the requirements paper mentioned requirements of free internal traffic within various sectors of Berlin under the requirement of freedom of access to the city. Mr. Hillenbrand noted that this was an optimum requirement since there was not now full freedom of traffic. Mr. Pauls agreed and said he felt a demand for full freedom of movement within the city should be included as an access requirement in the preliminary Western position on Berlin. It could then be dropped during the negotiations as a Western concession in return for more material Soviet concessions.

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